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ABSTRACT: In this article author discusses the problem of the future contingents. He 
wants to show that the same problem holds for a number of related cases like deci-
sions, promises, beginnings, birth dates, moral luck, post-mortal harms, etc. The 
focus of the article is on the question of when and how statements about the fu-
ture acquire their truth values. Author argues that truth is a relational property that 
statements acquire when the events that they talk about occur. For this reason, the 
meanings of statements like I was right! or I knew! should not be taken at their face 
value but rather reinterpreted according to the proposed theory. Also, several other 
accounts are criticised and rejected: causal determinism, thin red line, eternalism and 
realism about the future.
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The puzzle and the solution
In the everyday language there are expressions like “It turned out that I was 
right!” or “Time has shown that I was right!” or “Further course of events 
has shown that I was right!”, etc. We also use simpler expressions like “I 
was right!” or “You see! What did I tell you?”. Of course, we can be wrong 
as well.1 Although these expressions are usual and common, there is a deep 
1 In this context right may mean true, it may mean prudentially right, it may also mean 
morally right. Here I use a pretheoretical notion of truth which is compatible with correspond-
ence as well as minimalist understanding of truth. Relevant sense of prudentially and morally 
right is here consequentialist: Right means has desired consequences. Nonconsequentialist sense 
in which right means rational in the light of the evidence available at the time of decision is not 
relevant here. 
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philosophical problem behind them. We use them in a kind of situation in 
which at t1 we make future-related statement or decision, and then later, in 
t2, it turns out that we were right.2 But the question is: When were we right? 
When did our statements or decisions regarding future events become true or 
right?3 In principle, there are three options:
1) At t1 – a moment when they were made.
2) At t2 – a moment when the corresponding events occur.
3) Atemporally.
In this article I will defend the second option – the view that our statements 
and decisions are neither right nor wrong at the time we make them and 
that they become right or wrong later – at the time when the events they are 
about occur. I will try to show that this view is plausible and that it holds for 
a number of cases both in philosophy and in the everyday life.
The obvious problem for option 2) is how something that occurs at t1 
can become right or true later, post hoc, in t2. How is something like that 
possible? Or, if you want to put it that way, how can truthness and rightness 
travel back in time? Of course, nothing can travel back in time. Backward 
causation is impossible.4 So we are facing a dilemma here. On the one hand, 
it seems that all the properties that an event (statement or decision) has, it 
must have at the moment when it occurs. On the other hand, it seems that 
our statements and decisions regarding future events cannot be true or right 
at the moment we make them but only later when the events they were about 
happen. For it is not clear how they could be true or right before the events 
they are about happen. So, in order to show that option 2) is true, we have to 
show that the following principle is false:
All the properties that an event has, it must have at the moment when it 
occurs.
2 In order to reconcile the indeterminacy intuition (that statements about the future are 
neither true nor false) and the determinacy intuition (that statements have to be either true 
or false), John MacFarlane drew a distinction between a context of utterance and a context of 
assessment (MacFarlane 2003). I find this distinction appropriate and important, although I 
will not enter into the details of his semantic analysis. I am primarily interested in the ontol-
ogy of the future-related statements and decisions. For the critique of MacFarlane’s view see 
for instance (Brogaard 2008).
3 Of course, one might argue that future contingents are never true. An error theorist 
might argue that since future contingents are about not-yet-existent things, they are all false. 
An expressivist might argue that future contingents state no facts but rather express our hopes 
and fears about the future and as such they have no truth value. One might argue that future 
contingents are concealed imperatives and as such have no truth values. On this analysis the real 
meaning of “Train leaves in 5 minutes.” would be “Hurry up!”. 
4 Though there are authors who argue that backward causation is possible: Jan Faye in his 
book The reality of the future from 1989.
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However, there are a number of cases that convincingly show that this prin-
ciple is false and that events can acquire their properties later. This is not 
surprising because we are dealing with relational properties here, not with 
intrinsic ones.5 Being true and being right are relational properties of our 
statements and decisions.6 Statements and decisions are not true and right 
by themselves but only in relation to circumstances that are external to them. 
And these circumstances sometimes occur after we make our statements and 
decisions. For this reason it is possible that statements and decisions made at 
t1 become true and right at t2.
The abovementioned principle seems to be true for the intrinsic prop-
erties of events, like time and place of occurrence, duration, intensity, etc. 
Whether a statement was made with a certain tone or whether a decision was 
made with a hesitation are intrinsic properties and they cannot depend on 
anything that happens later. On the other hand, being true and being right 
are relational properties and they can depend on things that happen later.7 
Cambridge change is not much of a change, but it matters. Now, let’s focus 
on cases that show that the abovementioned principle is false and that conse-
quently option 2) can be true.
Supporting cases
Promises can be fulfilled or unfulfilled, kept or broken. However, at the mo-
ment we make them, they are neither fulfilled nor unfulfilled, they become 
fulfilled or unfulfilled later, depending on our actions. This is not surprising 
because promises are essentially temporal. They are kept or not kept over 
time, not instantaneously. If I promise you today that I will do something 
for you next week, the promise that I made today will acquire the property of 
being fulfilled or unfulfilled next week.
Investments can be good or bad, depending on whether they have posi-
tive or negative rates of return. Decision to invest in the Bitcoin was a right 
thing to do. However, the decision was not right before the rise of the Bitcoin, 
it became right at the time of its rise.
5 In this article I use relational as opposed to intrinsic, although this terminological choice 
can be seen as problematic. For instance, the property of having longer legs than arms seems to 
be both intrinsic and relational. However, it is questionable whether this is a good counterex-
ample because a whole has this property only with reference to its parts. Discussion on this 
problem can be found in Marshall and Weatherson (2018).
6 Obviously, I assume that statements and decisions are events.
7 Although I would like to remain neutral in respect to the theory of truth, the idea that 
truth is a relational property fits naturally with the correspondence theory.
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In Casablanca character Rick says, “Louis, I think this is the beginning 
of a beautiful friendship”.8 However, whether an encounter is or is not going 
to be the beginning of a beautiful friendship depends on the further develop-
ment. The beginning of a beautiful friendship is a property that an encounter 
can only acquire later, in retrospective.
Birth dates acquire many properties after they occur. Ljudevit was born 
in 1987 and in 2018 he married Gabriela.9 So, it is true that Gabriela’s hus-
band was born in 1987, although he was not yet Gabriela’s husband at the 
time when he was born. The date of his birth acquired one more property in 
2018 – it became the birth date of Gabriela’s husband. In 2018 Ljudevit’s 
birth date acquired a property that it did not have before.
The father of Croatian literature Marko Marulić was born in 1450. Marulić 
wrote his masterpiece Judita, an epic poem, in 1501. Therefore, in 1501 it 
became true that the author of Judita was born in 1450. It was not true be-
fore 1501 because Marulić did not write Judita before that. So, the event of 
Marulić’s birth acquired a new property in 1501 – the property that it was the 
birth of the author of Judita. Also, Marulić is regarded as the father of Croatian 
literature. But it was already the beginning of the 20th century when the histo-
rians of Croatian literature achieved consensus that Marulić was its father. So, 
the claim that the father of Croatian literature was born in 1450 became true at 
the beginning of the 20th century. Probably it became true earlier but certainly 
not before Croatian literature came into existence. So, one might say that at the 
beginning of the 20thcentury, after 450 years, Marulić’s birth acquired another 
property – the property of being the birth of the father of Croatian literature.
Whether an armed incident is or is not the beginning of a war depends on 
the future course of events. If it is followed by a concatenated series of battles, 
it becomes the beginning of a war. If not, it remains an isolated incident.10
Here one might be tempted to take an antirealistic stance toward enti-
ties like national literature, war, etc. It might seem that there is a constitu-
tive subjective element in deciding whether a series of publications makes 
a national literature, or whether a series of battles makes a war. Don’t these 
decisions ultimately depend upon our taxonomies? No! Whether a number 
of battles constitutes a single war depends on causal relations between indi-
 8 Michael Curtiz’ 1942 film Casablanca, character Rick Blaine interpreted by Hum-
phrey Bogart.
 9 This point was clarified in the discussion with Gabriela Bašić, Ljudevit Hanžek, and 
Neven Sesardić.
10 In Fiction and Metaphysics Amie Thomasson analyzes the concept of dependence. She 
recognises cases of future dependence: Whether slight shaking of the ground is the beginning 
of an earthquake, and whether an individual is the beginning of a new species depends on the 
future course of events (Thomasson 1999/2008: 29–30).
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vidual battles and other relevant factors like political decisions, etc. Although 
sometimes it can be hard to decide, it is a perfectly objective matter. The same 
holds for national literature. So, although beginnings are relational, they are 
perfectly objective. The relevant point here is that they become beginnings of 
larger wholes later, when these wholes come into existence. According to this 
analysis, the property being the beginning of, in the case of events that extend 
in time, is a relational property that “travels back in time”. It is a property that 
an event does not have at the moment when it occurs, it acquires it later.
Moral Luck
In well-known cases of moral luck we can see how rightness might “travel 
back in time”.11 Paul Gauguin left his family in poor conditions and moved 
to Tahiti to paint. His family suffered and in this respect his decision was 
wrong. However, his decision was justified by his later success as a painter. 
His later success made his earlier decision right.12 The decision to abandon 
his family was not yet right at the time he made it. It became right later, when 
he succeeded as a painter. His decision from t1 became right at t2.13
Talking about painters in this context we have to mention Vincent van 
Gogh who, after his death, became the most expensive painter in the history 
of mankind. Although he lived in misery, he is the most expensive painter in 
the history of mankind. Was he the most expensive painter during his life but 
did not know it? No, he acquired this property after his death.
A case of a revolutionary is supposed to be parallel to the Gauguin’s 
case.14 A revolutionary starts an armed uprising against a cruel dictator. If he 
succeeds he becomes a hero. If he fails he becomes an irresponsible adven-
turer. So, his decision to start a revolution will become right or wrong later, 
depending on the outcome of the revolution.15 Sometimes a further course 
of events makes our decisions right or wrong.16
11 Here we are dealing with the so called resultant luck, “luck in the way one’s actions and 
projects turn out” (Nagel 1979: 28).
12 The case of Gauguin was put forward by Bernard Williams in his Moral Luck (Wil-
liams 1982: 22–26).
13 Though, in cases of moral luck the relationship between the decision and the right-
making outcome is typically causal, while the relationship between the statement and the 
truthmaking event is typically semantic.
14 Case of successful and unsuccessful revolutionaries was discussed by Thomas Nagel in 
”Moral Luck” in Mortal Questions (1979: 30–31).
15 Of course, things are not so simple. We can have high moral esteem for leaders who 
fail in their uprisings. Spartacus and Matija Gubec (the leader of the 1573 peasant uprising in 
Croatia and Slovenia) are regarded as heroes although their uprisings were unsuccessful.
16 Williams and Nagel were not interested in the temporal aspect of the situation. They 
were interested in the fact that moral properties of an action can depend on the factors that are 
beyond the control of the one who acts.
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Happiness, Good Life, and Death
King Priam of Troy lived very happily most of his life. However, at the end 
of his life, horrible things happened to him. He, his family, and his citizens, 
were killed and his town was destroyed. For this reason Solon said that we 
cannot say whether somebody had a happy life when one is still alive.17 We 
have to wait until the very end of one’s life to make a right judgment. The 
idea is that things that happen later in our life can affect our life as a whole. 
There is a sense in which our present happiness depends on future events. 
Moreover, there is a sense in which our present happiness can depend on 
events that will happen after our death.18 Even if Priam had died 6 months 
earlier, there is still a sense in which the destruction of Troy would have been 
something horrible for him. But how can post-mortem events affect us ante-
mortem? How can they “travel back in time”? There is a plausible answer. King 
Priam had his preferences – things that he cared about. Once his preferences 
were formed, they can be satisfied or unsatisfied years or decades later, even 
after his death. In fact, King Priam was better off after Heinrich Schliemann 
rediscovered Troy and thereby brought back some of its glory. Of course, the 
relationship cannot be causal because backward causation is not possible. 
King Priam cannot be affected because he does not exist anymore (if he ever 
did). But preferences he had when he was alive can acquire a relational prop-
erty of being satisfied or of not being satisfied years after his death. And in 
this sense things that happen after his death can be good or bad for him.
Objections
Truth is atemporal 1: Conceptual analysis
Common objection to the proposed view is that truth is by its nature some-
thing atemporal. The objection might run as follows: Truth is not something 
that can change over time. Either something is true or it is not. It cannot 
become true, cease to be true, etc. Truth is something that is immune to 
changes in space and time. If a proposition is true in Europe, it cannot be 
false in Asia. If a proposition is true today, it cannot be false tomorrow. It is 
irrelevant who, when and where utters a proposition. If something is true, 
it is true always, everywhere and for everybody.19 Also, primary bearers of 
17 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, Chapters 10 and 11.
18 Thomas Nagel raised this question in “Death” in Mortal Questions (1979: 4). In the 
contemporary discussion about death there is a number of answers to the question of when is 
post-mortal event bad for us (Luper 2014).
19 This view was defended by Richard Taylor, a champion of fatalism, in his Metaphysics 
(1963/1974: 68).
215B. BERČIĆ:  I Was Right!
truth are propositions and propositions are abstract entities outside time 
and space.20 For these reasons, the objection runs, we have to reject the idea 
that propositions about future contingents became true when corresponding 
events happen. If true at all, they are true already at t1. If they are not true, 
they cannot become true at any later time.
This objection may have some rhetorical force, but it is not clear why 
anybody should take it seriously. Some truths obviously are atemporal. It is 
certainly inappropriate to ask When 2+2=4? or Where a2+b2=c2?. But some 
truths obviously are temporal (in a sense that there is a specific time when 
they come into existence). The assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo 
took place on 28 June 1914. It is hard to see how this proposition could 
have been true before 28 June 1914.21 Talk about the eternal character of 
truth seems completely illegitimate in this case. Though, something close to 
it really is the case. Once the assassination took place on 28 June 1914, it will 
forever remain true that it took place on 28 June 1914. And this is the sense in 
which propositions cannot alter their truth value. But this certainly does not 
mean that it was true before 28 June 1914.
The view that propositions are abstract entities out of space and time is 
very problematic and it probably causes much more problems than it solves. 
No matter what views on the nature of propositions one has, in this arti-
cle I discuss statements, concrete tokens uttered in space and time, like this 
evening’s weather forecast read on the Croatian national TV 7.30 news.
Truth is atemporal 2: The law of excluded middle
The idea that propositions about the future have yet no truth value is at odds 
with the law of excluded middle.22 This law states that for every proposition 
holds that it is either true or its negation is true (p V non-p). The problem 
arises because it seems that the law holds for the propositions about the fu-
ture as well. It is already true that either it will rain tomorrow or it will not 
rain tomorrow. Since the only way that a disjunction can be true is that one 
disjunct is true, it must be the case that one disjunct is already true. We do 
20 Several colleagues mentioned this objection but none of them took it as a serious prob-
lem. Among others: Neven Sesardić, Majda Trobok, Dušan Dožudić, Tomislav Čop.
21 One might object that here I assume the A-theory of time. However, I think I do not. 
A proponent of B-theory of time must have a way of saying that Ferdinand was not killed on 
June 27, 1914 but June 28, 1914. It is one thing to say that Ferdinand is killed on June 27, 
1914, and another thing to say that on June 27, 1914 it is true that he is killed June 28, 1914. 
B-theorist has to deny the first claim, typically he argues in favour of the second. 
22 The problem was discussed by Aristotle in De Interpretatione, Book IX, § 28–40. This 
is where he discusses the famous sea battle argument.
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not know which one is true, but we know that one must already be true. 
Therefore, the objection runs, our statements and decisions regarding future 
events, if true and right at all, already are true and right.
It would be hard to deny that it is true that either it will rain tomorrow 
or it will not. However, the question is, what makes this proposition true, 
tomorrow’s rain or its logical form? Obviously, what makes it true is its logi-
cal form (p V non-p), not tomorrow’s rain. This is a proposition of logic, not 
a proposition of meteorology. So, it is not true that the only way in which a 
disjunction of this form can be true is that one of its disjuncts has to be true. 
It can be true when no disjunct is true. Moreover, it has to be true, due its 
logical form. The proposition is a tautology and, as such, it has no factual 
content, it says nothing about the weather. Imagine that a meteorologist an-
nounces that tomorrow it will either rain or it will not (p V non-p). Or that if 
tomorrow it will rain, then it will rain (p → p). That would not be informa-
tive, not about the weather, and not about the future. Such propositions, 
although grammatically formulated in the future tense, are not about the 
future at all. Therefore, instances of the law of excluded middle do not show 
that statements about the future contingents have their truth value already at 
the moment we make them.
Truth is atemporal 3: Contemporary science
A number of people believe that contemporary science shows that the future 
is equally real as the past and the present.23 If this is so, then our statements 
and decisions regarding future events already are true or right at the time 
when we make them.
This view is very counterintuitive and hard to believe. But we will not 
discuss its truth here. We would rather concentrate on its consequences for 
the initial puzzle. If the view was true, then our statements and decisions 
about the future would in a sense have their truthmakers and rightmakers 
at the moment we make them. However, the question is whether this sense 
would be the sense relevant for the discussion. According to the view, what 
makes our statements and decisions about the future true and right are very 
general characteristics of the universe described by Einstein’s special theory 
of relativity. However, when we make our statements and decisions regarding 
the future we normally do not have in mind the theories of advanced physics. 
When a car mechanic claims that an engine will run another 100.000 km, 
he does not have in mind anything related to the Einstein’s theory. And this 
23 The idea that Einstein’s special theory of relativity shows that future is determined and 
real was put forward by C. W. Rietdijk and Hillary Putnam (Rietdijk 1966; Putnam 1967). 
Eternalists and fourdimensionalists typically accept this idea.
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is a peculiar consequence of the proposed view – that we have in mind one 
thing and that another thing makes us right. In the case of knowledge these two 
things should coincide. If they do not, we do not have knowledge. And this 
means that all our true predictions and right decisions were just lucky guesses. 
Nimitz and Yamamoto were trying to predict the outcomes of sea battles, but 
it was not the Einstein’s theory that made their predictions true or false. This 
comment may sound unphilosophical, but it is not too much to ask that the 
actual truthmaker has to be a part of what one has in mind when one makes 
a prediction. Imagine that future science, on some completely unexpected 
ground, shows that God really exist. Would that mean that religious people 
had known that God existed? No! It would mean that their belief was just a 
lucky guess. And when we triumphally exclaim “You see, what did I tell you?!”, 
we do not want to say that we were right just by a lucky guess. We want to 
say that we had grounds for our claim and that these grounds were relevant 
for the predicted event.
True and right as intrinsic properties
One might object that the rightness of the right decision and the truthness 
of the true statement are too important to be relational properties, so they 
must be intrinsic properties of our decisions and statements. They are too 
important to be acquired later, so they must be intrinsic to decisions and 
statements from the very moment we make them.24 After all, we make pre-
dictions intending for them to be true and we make decisions intending for 
them to be right. The idea is that the relationship between a statement and 
its truth cannot be a relation, but it has to be something much closer. For 
instance, one might claim that truth is somehow constitutive of or inherent to 
the statement and that therefore it cannot be its relational property. In a sense 
this is true, but not in the sense that is relevant here. There really is something 
self-refuting in “Now I am going to tell you something false”. If I say that p, 
then ipso facto I say that p is true. However, what is built into the statement 
is that it purports to be true, not that it is true. Whether things really are as the 
statement says they are is not built into the statement. Otherwise false state-
ments would be impossible and we know that they are possible. Therefore, 
truthness of a statement is its external or relational property. The same holds 
for the rightness of decisions. Although an investment conceptually cannot 
24 In Dilemmas Gilbert Ryle talks about this option: “As sugar is sweet and white from 
the moment it comes into existence to the moment when it goes out of existence, so we are 
tempted to infer, by parity of reasoning, that the trueness or correctness of predictions and 
guesses must be features or properties which belong all the time to their possessors, whether 
we can detect their presence in them or not” (1954/2015: 17).
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be an investment without an intention to make profit, it is a contingent and 
relational matter whether an investment has positive return or not. There-
fore, although rightness and truthness are for us the most important proper-
ties of decisions and statements, they are nevertheless relational properties 
and there is nothing strange about it.25 If one wants, one might say that they 
are pragmatically essential because they are our primary interest, but onto-
logically they are relational.
Was true, was right, and knew
Since expressions like “I was right!” or “I knew that was going to happen!” are 
part of our common linguistic practice, a satisfactory philosophical theory of 
truth should account for that fact. The claim is that a satisfactory theory has 
to explain how it is possible that some statements are true and some decisions 
are right before the corresponding events happen. However, this objection 
does not have much weight. A philosophical theory can be conservative and 
preserve all or most of the features of our common linguistic practice. But 
it can also be revisionary and reject some parts of our common linguistic 
practice as ill-founded or just false. On the account defended in this article, 
expressions like “I was right!” or “I knew it!”, if taken literally, are just false. 
We cannot know things before they happen, and our decisions cannot be 
right before the corresponding events occur. Common linguistic practice is 
just sloppy and imprecise here. In the case of future contingents, instead of 
true, we might use semantically close expressions like accurate, correct, etc. 
After all, do you say that a weather forecast was true? Since knowledge entails 
truth, the same holds for expressions like “I knew it!”.
In spite of semantic imprecisions, there obviously is something good 
and praiseworthy in cases in which we say that we were right or that we knew 
what was going to happen. “I was right!” may mean that my decision was 
rational in the light of the evidence available at the time when I made it. “I 
knew it!” may mean that my prediction was a result of 20-years’ experience. 
After all, “I knew it!” may mean that I am the one who knows, that you 
should listen to me and follow me.
Knowledge of the future
To a certain extent we are good at predicting the future: meteorologists predict 
the weather, coaches predict outcomes of football games, businessmen pre-
dict returns of investments, etc. If we know the relevant factors in the present, 
25 Running faster than others is a runner’s primary goal although it is a paradigmatic case 
of relational property.
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we may correctly predict the future course of events. Perhaps such justified 
and accurate predictions deserve the label of knowledge. If a meteorologist 
knows that the Genoa cyclone causes a storm over the North Adriatic within 
a day, and if he knows that the Genoa cyclone has just started, he knows that 
within a day there will be a storm over the North Adriatic. This inference has 
a structure of modus ponens: If one knows that p and if one knows that p?q, 
then one knows that q. So, we might be tempted to say that a simple logical 
inference like modus ponens enables us to have knowledge about the future. 
However, we have to have in mind that implication here is not logical but 
rather causal and temporal. Perhaps one might try to define knowledge about 
the future along the lines of the causal theory of knowledge:
A knows that p at t1 iff A’s belief that p is at t1 caused by the factors that will 
bring about p at t2.
The idea is that the knowledge of the relevant factors in the present might 
be sufficient for the knowledge of the future. But this brings us back to the 
beginning. The question is, how can we know something that is not yet the 
case? Knowledge implies truth, and if something is not yet true, we cannot 
know it. Justified predictions can become knowledge only post factum, when 
the predicted events occur. The same holds for semantically close expressions 
like correct or accurate. Predictions become correct or accurate only after the 
predicted events occur.
Epistemic construal
One natural and simple reaction to the initial puzzle is that our statements 
and decisions are right at the moment t1 we make them, but we do not know 
that until the corresponding event E occurs at t2. According to this under-
standing, “It turned out that I was right!” has an epistemic meaning. The 
idea is that although I was right already at t1, that was not known until t2. 
However, the epistemic construal is untenable. The problem is not that be-
fore t2 we did not know whether p was true, the problem is that p was not 
true before t2. There was simply nothing to know before the corresponding 
event occurred. Statements cannot be true before their truthmakers happen. 
A good investment cannot be good before the money is in the account.
Under the assumption of an open future epistemic construal hardly makes 
much sense. However, it looks much better under the assumption of a fixed 
future. If the corresponding future events are already fixed, then our state-
ments and decisions already have their truthmakers and rightmakers. Under 
this assumption it makes sense to claim that statements about future con-
tingents already have their truth values although we do not know them yet. 
However, the assumption of a fixed future is highly implausible. The picture 
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is that future events are stored in a large stock and they wait for their turn to 
happen. Only if we accept this picture, we can accept the epistemic construal. 
And this seems to be too high a price to pay for vindicating suspicious lin-
guistic practice of using expressions like “I was right!”, “I knew it!”, etc.
Determinism, fatalism, and realism about the future
One might wonder whether the idea of a fixed future might be worked out 
at a lower cost. Perhaps we do not need a full-fledged realism about the fu-
ture and positions like eternalism or fatalism. Perhaps something weaker and 
more plausible would suffice. Maybe causal determinism would do? Causal 
determinism is the view that future events can be predicted, not the view that 
they are real and that they in a sense already exist.26 Causal determinism does 
not entail realism about the future. Assume that at t1 an astronomer makes a 
100% accurate prediction that next year at t2 celestial body B will be at the 
coordinates C. Even under the assumption of universal causal determinism, 
his prediction cannot be true before t2, that is, before the body reaches the co-
ordinates. Even in a completely deterministic universe, a 100% accurate pre-
diction cannot be true before the predicted event occurs. And what is needed 
for the epistemic construal is that prediction is true although we do not know 
it. This is why causal determinism is not strong enough for the epistemic con-
strual of future contingents. Only positions that embrace realism about the 
future, like eternalism or fatalism, are strong enough. A number of authors 
assume that if universal determinism were true, the problem of future con-
tingents would not arise at all because all the future events would be settled 
in advance. However, they are wrong. It is not sufficient that future events 
are settled by present factors, they have to happen. For this reason, even if uni-
versal determinism were true, there would still be a legitimate philosophical 
puzzle about the future contingents.27
One of the frequently asked questions in philosophy is what is the dif-
ference between determinism and fatalism, if there is any.28 Here we are in a 
26 Of course, predictability is an epistemic category, while determinateness is a meta-
physical category. Here predicatability is meant as a reliable indicator of determinateness: A 
system is predictable only if it is deterministic.
27 For instance, Michael Perloff and Nuel Belnap, discussing future contingents and the 
sea battle, say: “On our view, if determinism were everywhere and always true, the difficulty 
with which we are concerned would simply disappear” (2011: 582). Or, Alex Malpass says: 
“[F]uture contingents – future-tensed statements about events that are not themselves prede-
termined” (2016: 55). However, they are wrong.
28 Richard Taylor, for instance, claims that a consistent determinist should be a fatalist 
(1963/1974: 59). But, as we saw, a determinist is not a fatalist.
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position to give the answer: It is the realism about the future!29 Fatalism pre-
supposes realism about the future while determinism does not. A motive for 
determinism is the idea that we can calculate the future. On the other hand, 
a motive for fatalism is the idea that we can see the future. Nostradamus did 
not calculate the future on the grounds of available evidence. He allegedly 
saw the events from the future. And in order to see them, they have to exist. 
In a sense, they have to be real before they happen, and this is a very strange 
claim.
Thin red line
Perhaps there is a way to combine the idea of an open future with the idea 
that our statements and decisions about the future are true or right already 
at the moment in which we make them. A candidate is the idea that there 
is a thin red line that runs through the events that will happen. Although 
different futures are possible, only one will be actual. And there is a thin red 
line that links all the actual events, past, present, as well as the future ones.30 
The idea of a thin red line is a sort of a middle way between the fixed future 
and the open future. On the one hand, the future is open because there are 
different possible futures. On the other hand, the future is fixed because 
only events with a thin red line will happen. It is prima facie obvious how 
this idea fits the bill: A thin red line is the thing that makes our present 
statements and decisions about the future true or right already at the time 
when we make them. There is no realism about the future here, but there 
are truthmakers and righmakers for statements and decisions about the fu-
ture – the ones with a thin red line in their fabric. A thin red line extends 
from our statements and decisions at t1 to corresponding events at t2. And 
this is how it makes true or right the statements and decisions that we make 
at t1.31
Obviously, the question is whether this position is consistent. The future 
is either fixed or open. It cannot be both. A proponent of the thin red line ap-
proach wants to have a pie and eat it. If the future is open, future contingents 
cannot already be true. If the future is fixed, there cannot be different possible 
futures. For this reason, we should reject the approach as inconsistent.
29 Josh Parsons defines the thesis: “Realism about the future is the doctrine that future 
things exist, and are not constitutively dependent on wholly present things” (2005: 162). As a 
possible example he mentions the Australian Republic.
30 The view was analysed by Arthur Prior in his Past, Present, and Future, Chapter VII 
(1967) and also by Nuel Belnap and Mitchell Green (1994). Their view is also published as 
Chapter 6 of Facing the Future (Belnap, Perloff and Xu 2001).
31 Of course, if there is such a thing like thin red line, then it extends from the beginning 
of time to its end.
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Moreover, even if the idea of a thin red line might be somehow worked 
out, it is not strong enough to make future contingents true. As we saw, 
causal determinism is not strong enough to entail the truth of future con-
tingents, what is needed is realism about the future. Since the idea of a red 
thin line is usually worked out within the framework of causal determinism, 
it cannot provide a sufficiently strong ground for the view that statements 
about the future contingents already have their truth value.
A-language and B-language
The whole puzzle is formulated in the language of the A-series of time: not 
yet, still, not any more, was, will be, etc. However, the objection runs, if we 
describe the situation in the language of the B-series of time, there will be 
no puzzle at all.32 The idea is that without reference to the present, no puzzle 
would appear. However, this is not true. The whole puzzle can be described 
in the B-language alone, without any reference to the present. Here it runs: 
One makes statement S at t1. S states that E happens at t2. E really happens 
at t2 and S is true. The question is when is S true, at t1, at t2, or atempo-
rally.33 The whole puzzle is here, without any reference to the A-series of 
time. Though, puzzle might sound stronger and more dramatic if described 
with the A-vocabulary, but the language of the A-series of time is not essential 
to it. After all, B-series of time contains relations before and after, and that is 
sufficient to formulate the puzzle.
Tensing the truthmakers
One possible reaction to the puzzle of how truthness and rightness can “travel 
back in time” is to try to tense the truthmakers.34 Assume that p is asserted at 
t1, that E is the truthmaker of p, and that E occurs at t2. The idea is that p is 
true at t1, not because E already is the case at t1, but rather because it will be 
the case at t2. Prima facie this option might sound plausible. Today’s weather 
forecast that it will rain tomorrow is true today because it will rain tomorrow. 
So, although at t1 it is not yet the case that E (because E by assumption occurs 
32 Dušan Dožudić raised this objection.
33 One might object that under the assumption of the B-theory of time all truths are 
atemporal, and that it is inappropriate to ask when certain sentence become true. However, as 
I argued in the footnote 21 (discussing the assassination of Franz Ferdinand) B-theorist must 
have means for saying that sentence “F.F. is assassinated” is false on June 27, 1914 and true on 
June 28, 1914. So, even under the assumption of the B-theory of time, there must be a sense 
in which it is appropriate to ask when certain sentence bacame true. 
34 In a discussion David Pitt defended this view. Marian David helped formulating the 
view, though he did not find it promissing.
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at t2), at t1 it already is the case that at t2 it will be the case that E. The idea 
is that there are tensed truthmakers and that future truthmakers work equally 
well as the present ones. On this view, things that will happen can make our 
present statements true or false just as things that do happen. A truthmaker 
tenser has to ground a present truth in a future truth. In order to do that, he 
has to accept the principle:
If it is at t1 true that at t2 it will be true that p, then p is true at t1.
The idea is that something is already true because it will be true in the future. 
Of course, the question is how can something already be true when the as-
sumption is that it will be true. For, if something will be the case, it means 
that it is not yet the case.
So, an immediate response to this view is simply to repeat the intuition 
that only real events can be truthmakers. Since future events are not yet real, 
they cannot serve as truthmakers. They can be truthmakers only when they 
happen, not before that. Of course, the question is who begs the question 
here, but the intuition that only real events can be truthmakers is widespread 
and well entrenched. So it seems that the burden of proof is on the one who 
wants to tense the truthmakers. In this place a truthmaker tenser might claim 
that we should not be biased toward the present, and that future events are 
equally real as the present ones. But this claim is realism about the future. 
Therefore, it seems that one can tense the truthmakers only at the cost of 
accepting realism about the future. So to say, it is true today that I will eat 
shrimp tomorrow only if there is a sense in which I already am eating shrimp 
tomorrow. The ungrammaticality of this formulation at least prima facie 
counts against the view that it expresses. If this analysis is correct, it shows 
that tensing truthmakers cannot be a position on its own, but necessarily has 
to collapse into eternalism or some similar position.35
Conclusions
1) The puzzle of future contingents is not limited only to truth values of 
statements about future contingent events. It is a widespread phenom-
enon. It includes decisions, promises, investments, births, beginnings 
35 In Truth and Truthmakers D. M. Armstrong defends the Omnitemporal view that “pro-
vides straightforward truthmakers for all truths about the past and the future. The past exists. 
The future exists. They are ‘there’ (they exist, they are real) to be truthmakers” (2004: 145–
146). However, the question is whether an eternalist can take tenses seriously. For a tenser, 
future should be something that will be the case and is not yet the case, while for an eternalist 
future in a sense already is the case. Since an eternalist has to reject the idea of irreducible 
tenses, the question is whether he can tense the truthmakers in any interesting sense. It seems 
that one can tense the truthmakers only if one does not take tenses seriously.
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(wars, friendships, epochs, etc.), consequentialist justification of our ac-
tions, assessments of good life, post-mortal harms, etc.
2) Being right and being true are relational properties. They are not intrinsic 
properties of our decisions and statements.
3) Things and events can acquire their relational properties later. This is the 
sense in which properties can “travel back in time”. Things and events 
must have their intrinsic properties at the time of their occurrence, but 
they can acquire their relational properties later.
4) Causal determinism is not strong enough to provide truth for future con-
tingents. Consequently, the idea of a thin red line is not strong enough 
to make future contingents true. The idea of tensed truthmakers is also 
not strong enough for this purpose. Only realism about the future can 
make future contingents true before corresponding events happen, but 
this view seems very implausible.
5) In the contexts where our decisions and statements are about future 
events, expressions like was right, was true, and knew cannot be taken at 
face value. Although they can be good enough for the everyday commu-
nication, strictly speaking, they have to be reinterpreted according to the 
proposed analysis.36
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